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Summer associates and clerks present significant problems because they
frequently "split" summers among law firms. The Second Circuit has held
that a law firm may be disqualified for hiring an attorney who had been exposed to adverse client confidences while a clerk at another firm.I' The court
found the2 crucial factor to be that the clerk had access to confidential information."1
Conclusion
The problem of vicarious disqualification is as old as the legal profession
itself. Rules have been adopted to provide a practical solution. However, the
judiciary is hesitant to take action because of the inequities that may affect a
client. In the context of screening, however, the judiciary has incorrectly
placed a greater emphasis on protecting the mobility of the attorney. The two
attitudes are inconsistent. The rules indicate that the protection of the client
is of the utmost importance. This is where the judiciary should concentrate
its efforts.
Warren Fields

Constitutional Law: Dow Chemical Co. v. United

States: Aerial Searches, Business Premises, and the
Fourth Amendment
Precision aerial photographs of an industrial complex taken without a warrant do not constitute a search for fourth amendment purposes, according to
the holding of the Supreme Court in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States.'
The Court reached this conclusion by determining that Dow had no
"reasonable expectation of privacy" because the facility was more like an
"open field" than the curtilage of a home. 2 However, even if curtilage status

111. Consolidated Theatres v. Warner Bros. Circuit Mgt. Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir.
1954) (attorney considered to be a law clerk had access to client files).
112. See supra note 110.
1. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986) (5-4 decision).
2. Id. at 1827. For an early discussion of the concept of curtilage, see 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 225.
The word originally signified the land with the castles and outhouses, inclosed
often with high stone walls, and where the old barons sometimes held their court in
the open air, and the curtilage was originally known as the fenced-in area surrounding a castle.... The trend of modern decisions, and especially in the United
States, ha. been to enlarge the original meaning of the word, and to include therein
any house near enough to the dwelling house to be within its protection as a part
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had been conferred on the facility, exposure to general aerial views rendered
the EPA's photography a nonsearch. The Court's approach forced Dow's
facility to fit into the curtilage/open field dichotomy despite the facility's
unique characteristics. Had the Court first applied an administrative search
analysis instead of focusing on distinctions between a curtilage and an open
field, a more tailored decision might have been reached.
This note addresses the question of whether a more circumspect analysis
would have been preferable to the approach taken by the Supreme Court.
Applying the administrative inspection analysis offered here, the EPA did in
fact conduct a search. The administrative inspection analysis explained in this
note is better suited to determine the reasonableness of a search under the
fourth amendment than is the traditional "reasonable expectation" approach
used by the Court.
The first part of this note traces the history of the fourth amendment and
judicial decisions defining its applicability in commercial settings. In the next
part, the Dow case history in the lower courts is discussed. The note then
evaluates the problems associated with the approach taken by the Supreme
Court. The note applies a logical framework to the facts in analyzing administrative searches in fourth amendment terms. Finally, a brief application
of the facts in Dow to the framework presented will be given.
Application of the Fourth Amendment in Commercial Settings
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized."
The language of the amendment does not make clear whether it is applicable in commercial settings. The circumstances surrounding the adoption
of the amendment, however, leave little room for doubt as to its applicability
in commercial settings. Perhaps even more important, the Supreme Court, in
a long line of cases, has held that the fourth amendment protects business
premises.
The earliest English common law prohibitions of unreasonable searches
and seizures involved the confiscation of papers from business premises. 5 At

of the domestic economy of the family, and to consider the same as a part of the
dwelling house.
25 C.J.S.2d Curtilage § 21 (1966), at 81-82.
3. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765) (warrant that named person to be
searched but did not name items to be seized invalid); Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.
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the same time the English common law was developing its own limits, the
American colonists were also becoming concerned about the government's
unbridled authority to search and seize. The Writs of Assistance Case argued
in early 176 t demonstrated the vehemence with which many of the colonists
viewed warrantless searches of business premises. 6 One commentator described the case as the
first link in the chain of events leading to the
7
American Revolution.
Writs of assistance permitted any authorized representative of the Crown
to search for and seize goods that had escaped taxation. So named because
all officers and subjects of the king were commanded to assist in their execution,' the writs were especially despised by businessmen and merchants.,
They were commonly issued, temporarily indefinite, and textually vague.
Because of the colonists' experiences with the British and their use of writs
of assistance, the state constitutions after the Revolution generally reflected a
preoccupation with writs of assistance and general warrants. Virginia's Bill
of Rights, often regarded as the model for the Federal Bill of Rights, is
representative of this concern.' 0
From writs of assistance and general warrants to specific prohibitions in
state constitutions, the history of the fourth amendment is inexorably tied to
the privacy interests of business owners. Although the antecedents of the
amendment are clear enough, it was not until Boyd v. United States that the
Supreme Court validated the extension of protection to commercial
settings." In Boyd, defendants in a criminal action were compelled to turn
over invoices establishing the value of illegally imported glass products. According to statute, had the defendants failed to produce the invoices, a confession would have been assumed. Even though the defendants objected to

1762) (general warrant to search and seize prohibited). See generally 2 MAY'S CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND

1760-1860, at 128-30 (F. Holland ed. 1912).

6. The case is also referred to as Paxton's Case. See D. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY 33 (1979).
7. N. LAssoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUrION

51 (1970).

8. Id. at 53-54.
9. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978).
10. The final act of the Virginia Convention of 1788 was to recommend amendments to the
Constitution. The fourteenth amendment read:
That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and
seizures of his person, his papers and his property; all warrants, therefore, to
search suspected places, or sieze [sic] any freeman, his papers or property, without

information upon Oath (or affirmation of a person religiously scrupulous of taking an oath) of legal and sufficient cause, are grievous and oppressive; and all
general Warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend any suspected person, without specially naming or describing the place or person, are dangerous and
ought riot to be granted.
VIRGINIA COMM'N ON CONSTITUTIONAL

GOVERNMENT,

WHEN VIGINIA JOINED THE UNION

(reprint 1963).
11. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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the introduction of the invoices as evidence, a conviction was obtained and
2
upheld on appeal.'
On review, the Supreme Court recognized the government's right to seize
illegal goods. In this case, however, personal papers were seized, which was
at odds with the history and purpose of the fourth amendment.' 3 The Court
reasoned that:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty, and private property, where that right has never been
4
forfeited by his conviction of some public offence.
The Court went on to state that the Framers would not have allowed "insidious disguises of the old grievance which they had so deeply abhorred."' 5
A more lucid description of a corporation's rights under the fourth amendment was given in Hale v. Henkel.'6 In Hale the secretary-treasurer of a corporation was held in contempt of court for refusing to produce subpoenaed
documents and answer questions before a grand jury investigating possible
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Court discussed at some length
the inapplicability of the fifth amendment to corporate officers refusing to
testify about the acts of the corporation. 7 While the fifth amendment was
held to have been designed to protect only private individuals, the Court held
that a corporation may be protected from unreasonable searches under the
fourth amendment. 8 The Court found no restrictive implications in the
fourth amendment. Because a corporation is an association of individuals
under a distinct name and is granted legal status as a separate entity, it does
not necessarily waive any constitutional rights as a feature of its formation. 9
The significance of Hale lies in the fact that the fourth amendment applies
equally to both individuals operating privately held businesses as well as to
corporations.
The delineation of rights under the fourth and fifth amendments set forth
in Hale was upheld and further clarified in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co.
v. Walling. 20 The case involved a subpoena duces tecum issued as part of an
administrative investigation of suspected violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The corporation under investigation contended that the Act did
not apply to it and that the issue of applicability must be decided before a
ruling could be issued upon the legality of the subpoena. In upholding the
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 618.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 630.
Id.
201 U.S. 43 (1906).
Id. at 74-76.
Id. at 75-76.
Id. at 76.
327 U.S. 186 (1946).
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Act's applicability, the Court affirmed the fifth amendment's inapplicability
to corporations and the fourth amendment's protection of them as announced in Hale.
The Oklahoma Press decision is significant because of the additional
limitation placed upon the government's investigatory powers. 2 Holding that
the subpoena represented a "constructive search," the Court stated that an
administrative agency must have the statutory authority to investigate and
the materials specified by the agency must be relevant to the object of the investigation.2 2 It is important that the Court noted that adequacy of power
and relevancy to purpose are not rigid, formulistic requirements, but are
elements that will vary according to the specific circumstances of each situa23
tion.
Another sizeable element of protection under the fourth amendment was
added within the framework of the more modern and familiar occurrence:
the on-site municipal code inspection. In See v. City of Seattle, 24 the Supreme
Court held that a city fire department inspector did not have a right of entrance into a locked commercial warehouse without probable cause or a warrant. Seattle city law did not require the inspector to have either probable
cause or a warrant before making an inspection. The Court concluded that it
would be untenable to place fourth amendment restrictions on administrative
subpoenas ("constructive searches") as was done in Oklahoma Press while
allowing actual searches of commercial premises to be left to the discretion of
the inspector in the field. 25 The Court held the right.of business owners to be
free from unreasonable official entries to be as important as the privacy right
enjoyed by private homeowners. 6 No justification was seen in this context
for relaxing fourth amendment standards for businesses while homeowners
were given the full benefit of the amendment's protection. 21
Although the dissent in See offered a great deal of evidence documenting
the range of problems in urban settings that could be identified by warrantless inspections, 28 the majority held that a warrant is a necessary and
tolerable limitation on the right to enter and inspect.2 9 Hence, it is only
within the framework of a warrant procedure that an 3agency may have a
right to enter a commercial area not open to the public. 1

21. Id.

22. Id. at 202-05.
23. Id. at 209.

24. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
25. Id. at 545.
26. Id. at 543. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), decided the same day as

See, held that if obtaining a warrant does not frustrate the public purpose of an inspection, the
occupant of a private dwelling is not under a duty to allow a city health inspector to enter
without a warrant or probable cause. The Court applied the same principle to the facts in See.
Id. at 542.
27. See, 387 U.S. at 543.
28. Justice Clark's dissenting opinion provides a litany of statistics on urban problems such
as fire hazards, rodents, plumbing, crime, and contagious diseases. Id. at 550-52.
29. Id. at 544.
30. Id. at 545-46.
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See is the apex of fourth amendment protection for business entities. It is
not an absolute standard, however. Subsequent court decisions have carved
out exceptions providing the justification for warrantless searches, which the
Court in See alluded to but did not address. Nevertheless, the basic proposition in See is that at least some limitations on administrative inspections of
commercial premises are constitutionally required.
This proposition should be the starting point for any discussion of the
fourth amendment's relevance to an administrative search. From that
premise, one is better able to focus on the fourth amendment itself rather
than on intermittent case law that may be misleading. Under the requisites of
the fourth amendment, administrative inspections should be scrutinized by a
detached magistrate whenever possible to ensure that the inspection is
necessary, authorized by statute, and sufficiently limited in scope."' An administrative inspection analysis takes these considerations into account as
prima facie elements of a constitutional search.
The Supreme Court's decision in Dow is the vehicle this note uses to illustrate the problems that may result from deviating from an administrative
inspection analysis where a governmental administrative agency is involved in
an enforcement action. Dow was selected for this purpose because of the
probability that similar fact patterns will arise in the future. The remainder
of this note explains how Dow was decided, why the Supreme Court's
analysis may have been flawed, and why a modified administrative inspection
analysis may be preferable for future cases.
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States: Lower Courts' Analysis
In September 1977, the EPA conducted an on-site inspection of two power
plants located at Dow Chemical Company's Midland, Michigan, industrial
complex. Although Dow had granted permission for the first inspection, the
EPA's request for a second inspection was denied when Dow learned of the
EPA's intentions to take photographs. 2 In response, the EPA informed Dow
that it would consider seeking an administrative search warrant to gain access
to the plant.
The EPA did not seek a warrant; instead, it contracted with an aerial
surveyor to take photographs of the 2,000-acre facility. 33 Approximately
seventy-five color photographs were taken from elevations of 12,000, 3,000,
and 1,200 feet. A $20,000 Wild RC-10 aerial mapping camera was used to
take the pictures.3 4 Magnifying the pictures taken from 1,200 feet, power
lines as small as 2 inch in diameter were easily visible with no significant loss
3
in clarity.

31. Id. at 543-45.
32. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1822.
33. Id.

34. Id. Industry literature has described this particular camera as the "finest precision aerial
camera available." Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 n.2 (E.D. Mich.
1982).
35. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1827 n.5, explains that the reason power lines as small as /2 inch in
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The EPA did not inform Dow of its actions. After learning of the
photographs a few weeks later, Dow filed suit against the EPA in United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. 3 6 Dow alleged that
the EPA's flyover and aerial photography were an unreasonable search under
the fourth amendment, that the photographs were a taking of property
without due process in violation of the fifth amendment, 7 and that38 the EPA
had exceeded its enforcement authority under the Clean Air Act.
Two issues represent the thrust of the court's inquiry. The first issue is
whether the EPA had statutory authority for its actions; the second is
whether these actions violated the fourth amendment. If the EPA's flyover
and photography were not authorized by statute, the fourth amendment is
largely irrelevant to the case. If, on the other hand, the EPA was acting
under statutory authority, the action may nevertheless be prohibited by the
fourth amendment as an unreasonable search.
The district court held that despite the broad powers given to the EPA, it
had not been given the statutory authority to make aerial inspections and
take photographs from that vantage point.3 9 The court drew a restrictive implication that only earthbound inspections were authorized by statute from
the portion of the Clean Air Act that granted the EPA a "right of entry to,
upon, or through any premises" upon presentation of credentials.40
Despite its ruling that the EPA had not acted under statutory authority,
the district court went on to consider the fourth amendment issue. On this
issue the court held that the EPA had conducted an unreasonable search. Applying an administrative search rationale, the court found that the EPA did
not have the authority to make warrantless searches . 4 Alternatively, applying the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard set forth in Katz v.
United States,'4 the court held that Dow has an expectation of privacy and

diameter are visible is because of the contrast with snow on the ground. It is hard to see why this
makes much difference. Although snow may not be on the ground year-round, it is safe to
assume that in places like Michigan, snow can be expected to be on the ground for a significant
part of the year.
36. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
37. Id. at 1158. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. EPA sought summary
judgment on all three issues while Dow asked for summary judgment on the fourth amendment
and statutory issaes only. The district court withheld entering summary judgment on Dow's fifth
amendment taking claim, noting that genuine issues of fact remained. Id.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (1982).
39. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1375.

40. Id. at 1374.
41. Id. at 1359-60.
42. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Katz involved the wiretap of a phone
booth. Under Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), a physical intrusion was necessary
to violate the fourth amendment's proscription of unreasonable search and seizure. Katz rejected
the Olmstead standard and replaced it with what has become known as the "reasonable expectation" standard. The most common formulation of the standard has been taken from Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion, which frames it in the form of two questions: did the party
demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy, and if so, is that expectation one society is
prepared to accept as reasonable? 389 U.S. at 361. Katz is primarily a response to advancing
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that its expectation was reasonable. The court noted the adoption of laws
prohibiting misappropriation of trade secrets as a basis for the
reasonableness of Dow's expectation of privacy in this context.43 The court
also found that Dow's facility did not fall under the "open fields" exception
because of Dow's reasonable expectation and because it would have the effect of making the EPA's actions a nonsearch, even though the EPA had admitted that it was involved in a "quest for evidence." 44 The court noted the
advances in technology may eventually turn any area into an
possibility that
"open field." ' 45 Also, the EPA could easily have sought a warrant.
The EPA appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed
the district court's decision on both the statutory authority and fourth
amendment issues. 46 Comparing the EPA's general investigatory powers to
those exercised by the FBI, the DEA, and military investigators, the appellate
court held that the EPA did not reach beyond its statutory authority in tak47
ing aerial photographs.
The fourth amendment issue was framed in terms of whether the EPA had
conducted a search at all. In reaching its conclusion, the court applied the
Katz analysis exclusively: first, did Dow exhibit an actual expectation of
privacy, and second, was that expectation one society would recognize as
reasonable? The court determined that Dow did not show any expectation of
privacy from aerial photography, but even if it had, it would have been
unreasonable because of the resemblance between the Dow facility and an
open field." On that basis, the court held that the EPA had conducted a
49
nonsearch.
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States: The Supreme Court's Analysis
The Supreme Court granted Dow's petition for certiorari and affirmed the
Sixth Circuit's decision. On the statutory authority issue, the Court held that
the EPA did not need specific authority to carry out investigations with tools
available to the public at large. The Court indicated that the EPA's enforcement powers under the Clean Air Act are relatively expansive and are nonexclusive. Comparison was made to a police survey of traffic despite the
absence of specific authorization for aerial observation.5
On the fourth amendment issue, the Court followed the Sixth Circuit's approach. Examining the case strictly in terms of curtilage and open fields, the

technology that makes privacy independent of physical intrusion, as in the case of a telephone

wiretap.
43. Dow, 536 F. Supp. at 1367-69.
44. Id.at 1370.

45. Id.at 1371.
46. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984).

47. Id.at 315.
48. Id.at 313.
49. Id.
50. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1824.
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Court held that Dow's complex more closely resembled an open field than a
curtilage. The Court thought that enhancement of a naked-eye view,
available to the public, did not create constitutional problems, although
perhaps the use of more sophisticated technology such as a satellite may raise
that concern. 1
The Court did not explain why it discarded the approach taken by the
district court. The point of divergence between the district court and the
Supreme Court, and indeed the crux of the fourth amendment issue, is the
characterization of what the EPA did when it flew over Dow and took pictures.
If the action was a search, it should have been subjected to an administrative
search analysis under the fourth amendment. If, on the other hand, it was
not a search, then there was no need to consider constitutional protection.
The distinction is critical.
Reasonable Expectations
At this point it is helpful to look at one particular section of the Sixth Circuit's opinion. Before it applied the Katz analysis, the court drew a line between a "reasonable search" and a "reasonable expectation of privacy." According to the court, a "reasonable expectation of privacy" is the touchstone
for the determination of whether a search has occurred at all. 2 "Reasonable
search" is whether there was probable cause to conduct a search or whether
53
the limits of a warrant were exceeded.
The distinction the Sixth Circuit made in attempting to define a search is
unnecessary and subject to manipulation. As other writers have correctly indicated, "reasonable expectations" is not a concept of privacy that can
withstand determined and repeated assaults from the government or other
entities.- ' For example, if the government bombarded the media with announcements that everyone entering public buildings will be frisked by
police, there could be little, if any, "reasonable expectation" of privacy
when entering a public building. Any residual expectation would quickly
dissipate after the first frisking. One could then only have a reasonable expectation of no privacy when entering a public building. Yet most persons
would still call the frisking a search subject to fourth amendment scrutiny as
to whether the search was reasonable rather than expecte. 5 5 This is a simple
example of how the fourth amendment could conceivably be sidestepped
altogether by asking if there was a reasonable expectation of privacy before
deciding if a search actually took place. Then, one never reaches the question
of whether what took place was reasonable.6
51. Id. at 1826.
52. Dow, 749 F.2d at 312.

53. Id.
54. D. O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at 60; Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974); Note, A Reconsiderationof the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test,
76 MIcH. L. REv. 154, 177-79 (1977).
55. The fourth amendment makes no mention of expectations; only searches are divided between reasonable and unreasonable.
56. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 54.
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When asking whether the EPA conducted a search, both the Sixth Circuit
and the Supreme Court concluded that Dow had not demonstrated any expectation of privacy from aerial inspection; but even if it had, the expectation would have been unreasonable because of the classification of Dow's
facility as an open field rather than as curtilage." This particular categorization dilutes the protection of the fourth amendment for industrial complexes
such as Dow's. This either/or choice does not allow much room for atypical
situations that had not been encountered when the doctrine emerged. Nevertheless, the issue merits some attention. Arguing that an industrial complex
in certain instances can be analogized to the curtilage of a home returns
the type of protection afforded private homebusiness premises closer to
58
owners discussed in Hale.
The Industrial Curtilage
Common sense, as well as judicial interpretation, makes it clear that the
fourth amendment does not protect conduct in open fields as Justice Holmes
pointed out in Hester v. United States." Extending fourth amendment protection to a literal open field setting is unnecessary and unworkable. Necessity and workability of that protection, however, becomes more debatable as
the open field becomes less open and less like a field.
At the other end of the spectrum is the inner confines of a private dwelling. There could be little argument that no place deserves more protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally, the strength of this protection has even been extended to a limited area around the home called the
curtilage.61
Using place as a reference point in applying the fourth amendment is appealing. It is seemingly a bright line that makes for consistent decision making.
Once the categorization of either curtilage or open field is made, it is relatively
easy to decide if the activity is protected by the fourth amendment. 61
The problem with this dichotomy is embodied in the facts of the Dow case:
just exactly what is the Dow facility, curtilage or open field? What kind of
analysis is applied if the answer is neither? Can business premises ever have a
curtilage? Can they ever really be an open field?
The Dow complex is unique in terms of the dichotomy. The Supreme
Court admitted as much when it noted: "The area at issue here can perhaps
57.
58.
59.
fields).

Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
See supra text accompanying note 16.
265 U.S. 57 (1924) (special protection of the fourth amendment does not extend to open
See also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (no legitimate expectation of

privacy in open fields).
60. See supra note 2.
61. What constitutes a curtilage apparently is a mixed question of law and fact. See, e.g.,
United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1978) (curtilage ends at the outer walls of the
most extreme outbuildings); Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1956) (curtilage determined by proximity to dwelling, inclusion within the general enclosure surrounding the dwelling,
and the use and enjoyment of the area as an adjunct to the domestic economy of the area);
United States v. LaBerge, 267 F. Supp. 686 (D. Md. 1967) (shed 190 feet away from dwelling not
part of the curtilage).
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be-seen as falling somewhere between 'open fields' and curtilage, but lacking
some of the critical characteristics of both." 6 2 Dow argued that its facility,
and more specifically the areas within the complex photographed by the
EPA, are actually part of an industrial curtilage with many of the attributes
of the curtilage around a home. Given the manufacturing processes contained in the facility and society's willingness to recognize the value of those
processes remaining secret, Dow asked that its facility receive a degree of
protection similar to what the curtilage of a home would receive. 63
The Court summarily rejected this notion of comparison between an industrial complex and the area around a home. It quickly concluded that
"[t]he intimate activities associated with family privacy and the home and its
curtilage simply do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between structures
and buildings of a manufacturing plant.""
The Court offered no reasoning to support its conclusion. Obviously, a
2,000-acre manufacturing plant is not the same as a person's backyard. But
despite the difference, the expectation of privacy can aptly be analogized.
Familial intimacy is not the only reason for valuing privacy. 6" Dow
presumably valued its privacy because of the nexus between its industrial
knowledge and its corporate identity. Just as a family would lose some of the
characteristics that make it a family if intimacy were denied, so might a
business lose some of its vital characteristics if its privacy were denied. If in
the past Dow had no ability to determine who had access to its manufacturing processes, chances are that Dow would be a vastly different organization
than it is today.
Of course, the "right to privacy" is not mentioned specifically in the Constitution. That right, however, has been given constitutional weight via the
first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments in various situations." For
example, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the marriage relationship was given
protection from outside interference through a "right to privacy" because of
the sacredness of the marriage bond, the social utility of marriage as an institution, and the personal intimacy involved. 67 The Court in Dow recognized
that a business has the same kind of right to privacy, namely a right to be
free from unreasonable inspections in the form of physical intrusions into its
facility. 68 The fourth amendment protects this right. It would also seem to
protect the area in Dow's facility from being photographed if physical intrusion were necessary to pass through the covered portions of the plant to
reach the uncovered portions.

62. Dow, 105 S. Ct. at 1825-26 (emphasis added).
63. Id.at 1825.
64. Id.
65. The difference between "intimacy" and "privacy" may only be one of specificity. For
the purposes of this note, "intimacy" is used only in reference to the relations enjoyed in a family setting.
66. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
67. Id.at 486.
68. Dow, 105 S. Ct. at 1825.
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The basic reason for creating a curtilage around a private dwelling is that
some of the activities that take place within a home may also take place in
the backyard as well. Relying on this basic premise, one could logically create
a curtilage for a business entity as long as the same type of activities take
place there that take place inside the principal business structure. Just as the
concept of a curtilage for the private dwelling was not designed to protect
criminal activity from discovery, so is the concept of an industrial curtilage.
Curtilage is extended to protect certain activities in a limited outside area.
In Dow's case there has been societal recognition of a need for enhanced
protection of privacy. Trade secret laws, both federal and state, represent

special awareness of the important interests served by sensitive technical in70
formation remaining secret.69 For economic and constitutional reasons,
trade secrets are given special protection from unnecessary discovery and exitself provides for protection of trade secrets
ploitation. The Clean Air Act
7'
actions.
enforcement
during
The majority opinion rejected the trade secret reasoning. Declaring that
the EPA did not compete with Dow, the Court held that "[sitate tort law
governing unfair competition does not define the limits of the Fourth
Amendment. ' "7 The Court concluded that photography is barred only73where
there is an intent to use trade secrets revealed by the pictures taken.

This argument fails to address the central feature of trade secret protection: that Dow and others similarly situated should receive the maximum

protection available from unauthorized trade secret appropriation without infringing upon legitimate government interests. The irony is that the EPA (or

any other regulatory body) is probably unaware of whether it possesses sensitive trade secret information. The business entity must usually make special
arrangements with the regulating agency to obtain additional protection of
trade secrets. Where the agency does not inform the business that it is in

possession of information that may be potentially sensitive, the business is
unable to take full advantage of trade secret protection. In this case, while

the EPA does not directly compete with Dow, it would be in possession of
sensitive information from Dow's perspective. There is always the possibility
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982) is the principal prohibition on disclosure of trade secrets by
government officials. The prohibition extends to information that "concerns or relates to the
trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential
statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person."
Id. There are approximately forty-five other trade secret provisions in various pieces of legislation covering everything from poultry inspections to electronic product radiation control.
70. The preservation and confidentiality of trade secrets is an important incentive to continue to innovate. It does not require much imagination to envision a state of affairs where
technical information developed through the private investment of money in research and
development was in the public domain. One court has held that trade secret laws work in harmony of purpose with patent laws. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (1982). This provision prohibits the misappropriation of trade secrets
by the EPA that are gathered as a result of enforcement actions.
72. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1823.
73. Id.
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of theft or loss through carelessness. In addition, if not carefully guarded,
others not directly involved may have access to the photographs or other
evidence.7 ' Also, the information could be inadvertently passed on to
legitimate competitors. Congressional investigators could also acquire the information. 7' These are just a few of the scenarios trade secret laws are
designed to prevent. 7 6 While requiring a warrant in such circumstances does
not guarantee that any of the foregoing scenarios would never materialize, it
would allow for an impartial party to have some input as to whether the information sought was of a potentially sensitive nature.
Aerial Views
Even if the Court recognized the existence of an industrial curtilage with a
higher degree of privacy, the real problem in protecting it in a case like this is
clearing the hurdle of aerial surveillance as being something other than a
plain view. Ciraolo v. California, decided the same day as Dow, held that
aerial surveillance from a police helicopter that discovered marijuana growing in the backyard of a home enclosed by a 10-foot fence did not violate the
fourth amendment. 77 Ciraolo affirmed the continuing validity of the curtilage
concept. Although the curtilage doctrine carries more protection from search
and seizure, it does not give protection from all outside views. Because the
backyard was exposed to an overhead view or a view from a "2-level bus, ' "'8
the homeowner cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy from those
vantage points. 9
Taking the Court's approach to its extreme, a homeowner must shield his
backyard to all possible views in order to enjoy complete privacy. 0 This
would inevitably require a roof and a fence higher than a double-decker bus.
The problem is more acute for industrial complexes such as Dow's. As Dow
explained in its brief, a roof would be prohibitively expensive. Safety concerns would also abound as explosive gases could become trapped, accumulate, and then ignite into a deadly fireball. 8'
It is extremely important to realize that Dow was not concerned with
photographs taken at ground level or with views from a nearby hillside.82
Since the facility is located in the vicinity of a local airport, Dow is probably
not worried about random views from passing airplanes. Dow's expectation
of privacy is limited.
Before Katz, physical intrusion in the form of a trespass delineated a
search from a nonsearch. 8 3 The type of intrusion advancing technology made
74. Stevenson, Protection of Confidential Business Information: an Overview, in PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION 19 (1981).

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
78. Id. at 1812.
79. Id. at 11313.

80. Id. at 1818.
81. Dow, 106 S.Ct. at 1828 n.1.
82. Id. at 1827.
83. See supra note 42.
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possible without physical entry has precipitated the change in thinking on
fourth amendment matters. By including the type of surveillance in which the
EPA engaged with any kind of aerial view such as a view from a passing
airliner, the Court returned fourth amendment analysis back to an artificially
simplistic and unrealistic process. What the Court is in fact saying is that if
the object is not covered very well, it is exposed to the public and, therefore,
no reasonable expectation of privacy can exist.84
Inexplicably, the Court accepted the EPA's concession that pictures taken
from a satellite would somehow be more intrusive than the photographs it
took and would therefore be proscribed by the Constitution. No reasoning
was given for the line drawn between a satellite photograph and one taken by
a precision aerial-mapping camera mounted in a plane. The two seem identical except that a satellite takes pictures from higher altitudes and orbits the
earth regularly-two seemingly irrelevant distinctions. Dow would not know
if it was being photographed by a satellite; it did not know it was being
photographed by a plane at 1,200 feet. Furthermore, it is doubtful that a
satellite could take pictures more revealing than the ones obtained by the
EPA, which showed power lines with a diameter of 2 inch.6 Trivializing
fourth amendment protection by measurements in millimeters strips the
amendment of the substance demanded by those Framers who had experienced
the writs of assistance.8"
The Dow decision leads the way to the edge of yet another slippery slope.
The EPA's argument, adopted by the Court, is that aerial photography does
not violate any right to privacy because anyone can legally take a picture
from any place (except for Dow's competitors who intend to steal trade
secrets). Because anyone can take a picture, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. This is the fallacy of the reasonable expectation standard.
Because members of the general public can fly over Dow and take pictures
with an Instamatic, the EPA can fly over with a $20,000 precision aerialmapping camera with the sole purpose of obtaining seventy-five highly detailed color photographs. The Court apparently saw no difference between
88
the two situations. The result is a nonsearch.
Future Implications
It is not difficult to see how the Dow decision might self-destruct in the
future. The age of private satellite surveillance could soon be upon us.
LANDSAT, a satellite originally owned and deployed by the federal government to identify natural resources, has been sold to a private concern."

84. This is exactly the type of analysis that Katz was designed to replace. Before Katz, a
physical intrusion was necessary to violate the fourth amendment. With the Dow decision,
technologies which may be able to "see" through coverings, such as infrared heat devices, could
be used to circumvent the fourth amendment by penetrating a covering without the naked eye.
85. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826-27.
86. See supra note 35.
87. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 54.
88. Dow, 106 S.Ct. at 1827.
89. The Satellite Sale: Another Dose of Reality, Sci. Aug. 12, 1983, at 632.
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Although LANDSAT was originally used by the government to search only
for natural resources, one can visualize private companies launching their
own satellites with other economic pursuits in mind. Undoubtedly, the
photographic capabilities of these satellites will continue to become more
sophisticated.1 As these private companies begin to photograph, regardless
of what is photographed or intent, expectations of privacy begin to diminish.
The Court would be forced to reevaluate its dictum in Dow based on the
reasonable expectation standard. Ultimately, the government would be able
to engage in its own satellite surveillance because of the availability of
satellite photography to the public.
It seems incredible that a business or home must construct a roof to
enclose its curtilage or near-curtilage to protect itself from unwanted aerial
observation. Most businesses are not concerned with the random glances of
passengers aboard airliners; at most they are fleeting and nonintrusive. Most
businesses, however, would object to a lingering stare or a precision
photograph taken from a plane or helicopter by a government agency.'9 The
Court declined to acknowledge different degrees of privacy interests from
aerial observation. The result was effectively to make all types of aerial
observation equal and, thus, to force a choice between sunlight and privacy,
or in Dow's case, safety and privacy.
ProposedAdministrative Search Analysis
A much more enduring result could have been reached had the Court
employed an administrative search approach. An administrative search
analysis allows for plain view exceptions and also addresses expectations,
while not focusing on them as the sole determinant of reasonableness under
the fourth amendment.
A four-step analysis could easily accommodate legitimate government interests with reasonable privacy concerns. It should be noted at the outset that
this approach is designed only for searches conducted by administrative agencies and not for investigations or searches carried out by other law enforcement agencies.
Did a Search Occur?
The Sixth'Circuit and the Supreme Court defined "search" as a term of
art.92 Using: the Katz analysis, 93 both concluded that the EPA did not conduct a search because Dow did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Defining "search" in terms of expectations, as explained earlier, is unnecessarily elastic although it does avoid the physical intrusion delineation. A
better way to determine if a search has taken place might be to first examine
the intent and motive of the actor and then determine if the conduct is
reasonable.
90.
91.
92.
93.

McElroy, Observing the Earthfrom Space, FTURIST, Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 17.
See NORML v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
Dow, 749 F.2d at 312.
See supra note 42.
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A possible criticism of any inquiry into intent is the inherent subjectivity of
determining what an actor was thinking when a particular action occurred. In
the context of administrative searches, the problem is not so serious as it may
appear on first impression. Administrative agencies are generally charged
with specific law enforcement duties. One effective way to enforce is to
search for evidence of violations. Many legislative acts governing administrative agencies specify searches as legitimate means of enforcement. If
a particular activity carried out by an administrative agency resembles a
search, it could be presumed or inferred that what took place was a search
because of the affirmative duty to enforce created by the legislature. It makes
little sense for an agency to request entrance to search and seize or to fly over
and take pictures of a plant that the agency is not authorized to regulate. In
this narrow sense, administrative agencies do not have the freedom of private
citizens to engage in whatever conduct they dhoose. As creatures created by
the state, their range of action is limited. This difference between the conduct
permissible for a private citizen and for an administrative agency is crucial; it
makes the intent inquiry workable in this context. Measuring the agency's action against legislative objectives where the action may be questionable would
provide some semblance of objectivity in the intent inquiry. The problem
with any ex post facto intent inquiry, whether it be for a common law tort or
an administrative search, is not the desirability of ascertaining intent but
rather pinpointing the intent somewhere along the spectrum of human
thought. For an administrative agency, intent is much easier to determine
because the spectrum of possible agency action is limited.
The purpose of the intent inquiry is to distinguish actions like precision
aerial photography from a picture taken by an ordinary passenger on an
airliner. This differentiation avoids the problem of an EPA official taking
pictures with an Instamatic from a passing airliner. This could be termed as
merely investigatory because it is highly unlikely that the EPA would actually
spend the money to conduct a search in this fashion. It would surely be much
easier and more cost-effective to request an administrative subpoena for
blueprints of Dow's plant. Another way of looking at the intent question is
the mirror image of the likelihood of an EPA official conducting a search
with an Instamatic from an airliner: the likelihood of a general member of
the public contracting with an aerial mapping company or purchasing a
$20,000 camera just to take pictures of an industrial facility. The oddity of
the %.,ccurrencepoints toward something more than a simple investigation.
The intent inquiry would also distinguish pictures taken by the mapping company for its own map-making purposes. Map-making is one of the permissible actions along the spectrum of activity for a map-making company. Had
the EPA claimed that it was making maps, it would be rather clear that
something else had been intended because the EPA is not charged with any
map-making duties. Examining intent in this way is much more likely to trigger further fourth amendment analysis than is an examination of the expectations of the party that is observed.
Another possible criticism of an intent-based inquiry is that it would be
overly broad. It is probably true that many of what are now called non-
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searches would become searches under this approach. However, that does
not mean that all searches would be prohibited under the fourth amendment.
What it means is that one proceeds to the next step of analysis. The opinion
of a magistrate is not necessary to tell the actor to proceed to the next step.
As the language of the amendment makes clear, only unreasonable searches
are unconstitutional." Thus, although an action may be classified as a search
because of the intent of the actor, it must still be deemed reasonable or
unreasonable. A broad definition of "search" does not impose any additional burdens on the judicial system at this stage; it does heighten fourth
amendment awareness within the agency.
Was the Search Reasonable Per Se?
Searches that are reasonable per se would fall under three exceptions: express consent, circumstances of'haste, or plain view." Plain view, of course,
would be the most relevant to the case at hand. A common sense definition
limiting plain view to observations unaided by extraordinary vision enhancement such as supertelescopic photographic equipment or satellite technology
would prevent the type of contortion to which the phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy" is subject.96 Express consent and circumstances of haste
are self-explanatory, at least conceptually. A full treatment of how they
97
would be applied in any unique way is beyond the scope of this note.
Was the Search of a Pervasively Regulated Industry?
Several cases have created an exception to the general proposition that
warrantless searches are unreasonable per se. By virtue of the fact that certain industries have been historically subject to pervasive regulation, a warrantless search does not contravene the fourth amendment.
Two industries have been explicitly exempted: liquor and firearms. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the requirement in See that an administrative inspection of business premises must
be accompanied by a warrant does not apply to the liquor industry. 8 Because
the liquor industry has traditionally been tightly regulated, and is still tightly
regulated, warrantless searches are not unreasonable. 99
United States v. Biswell held that warrantless searches of dealers of
firearms were not unreasonable.' 0 The Court advanced three reasons for
94. See supra note 55.
95. Amsterdam, supra note 54, at 358-60.

96. Another peripheral consideration is the consequences for the legal profession as a whole
when common terms are twisted and infused with new meanings. The public's perception of the
legal profession is at a low ebb. Linguistic honesty, where possible, could help restore lost confidence. See generally Lundquist, Where the Flaws Lie, 10 LITIG. 2 (1984); PannilU, All About
Litigation, 10 LI,,. 2 (1984).
97. Amsterdam, supranote 54, at 359-60, is an excellent starting point for a thorough discussion of these exceptions.
98. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
99. Id. at 75-76.
100. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
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creating the exception. First, there is an extremely strong state interest in the
control of firearms. Second, due to the nature of the business, warrantless
searches are necessary for effective enforcement. Third, the expectation of
privacy on the part of the dealer is minimal; a warrant in this kind of inspection would offer little protection. 0 1
Two other cases offer additional guidance in this area. Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc. 102 held that a warrantless OSHA inspection of a plumbing
business would be an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment. The
Court affirmed the exceptions created in Colonnade and Biswell but rejected
employee health and safety as a third caveat to the general rule.'0 3 A plumbing business does not have the same expectation of governmental search as
does the gun dealer or liquor distributor. In this case a warrant does offer
protection by assurance from a neutral third party that the inspection is
reasonable, authorized by law, pursuant to a specific administrative plan,
and sufficiently limited."'
In Donovan v. Dewey, a mine operator refused to allow an inspector on
the premises to check for violations of the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act (FMSHA) without a warrant.' 5 The Supreme Court held that the
FMSHA established a system of warrantless inspections that did not "offend
the Fourth Amendment."' 16 Inspections of commercial property that are not
authorized by law or do not further a federal interest are unreasonable searches.
But a search may also be constitutionally objectionable if it is so random, infrequent, or unpredictable that for all practical purposes there is no real expectation that property will occasionally be inspected. 7 The inspection procedure contained in the FMSHA avoided those pitfalls; the OSHA system did
not. Additionally, the Court noted a significant federal interest in mine safety. Instead of looking at the history of governmental regulation in the area, it
was held that the pervasiveness and regularity of inspections are determinative of actual expectations.' 00
The effect of the Donovan decision is to create a quasi-exception. Mine
safety is a significant federal interest, but not of the magnitude of liquor or
firearms. Warrantless inspections are permissible as long as they are not left
to the discretion of the inspector in the field. The authorizing legislation must
also establish an inspection system that adequately protects privacy interests
by the same type of notice and regularity that liquor and firearm businesses
are given.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 316.
436 U.S. 307 (1978) (5-3 decision).
Id. at 314-15.
Id. at 316.
452 U.S. 594 (1981).
Id. at 602.
Id. at 604.
Id. at 605-06.
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Does the Authorizing Legislation Contain a
Reasonable Inspection System?
The Marshall and Donovan decisions offer only clues as to the necessary
conditions for an administrative inspection system that protects commercial
privacy interests. There must be a significant federal interest present. Liquor
and firearms are of paramount interest, and mines of less interest, but still
significant. The Court in Marshall excluded employee safety from the paramount interest category, but did not necessarily exclude it from the next level
of significance. Had the inspections authorized by OSHA been less discretionary,' 09 it is quite possible that employee safety would have been given the
same status as mine safety.
There must be an expectation of regular inspection."10 Drawing from
Donovan, if the inspections are so random, infrequent, or unpredictable as
to not creale an expectation of regular inspections, the system does not adequately protect privacy interests. It is unclear whether those qualifiers are
conjunctive or disjunctive for purposes of judicial review of the authorizing
legislation.' ''
Dow and the Administrative Search Analysis
Applying the facts in Dow to the framework proposed in this note, the
EPA's actions might have been held to be unconstitutional. Under the intentbased first step of the inquiry, the EPA conducted a search. The EPA admitted as much when it stated that it was involved in a "quest for evidence.""'
A check for closeness of fit between a stated legislative objective and agency
action also points toward a search because the EPA is charged with enforcement responsibilities.
The EPA's search under the second step of the analysis could not be
classified as reasonable per se: it was not carried out pursuant to a warrant
nor did Dow give express consent for the search. Since the EPA left the time
for the actual photography to the aerial mappers," 3 there were no circumstances of haste. The area effectively searched was not in plain view
because the EPA had to contract with an aerial mapping company to obtain
photographs with the clarity and detail that the EPA desired. What the EPA
saw in the photographs was not what a plain view would have revealed, but
rather what modern photographic technology revealed.
The third level of the analysis examines whether Dow was a pervasively
regulated industry. Obviously, Dow does not fall under the automatic excep-

109. 29 U.S.C. § 65-7(A) (1982).
110. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 602.
111. The case only compares OSHA with FMSHA. Although the words "random," "infrequent," and "unpredictable" are used in the decision, all that can be discerned for certain is that
the inspection system must be "tailored."
112. Dow,536 F. Supp. at 1370.
113. Id. at 1361.
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tions of liquor and firearms. Whether air pollution in general would fall
under the second category of significant federal interest is debatable. More
specific standards would have to be formulated before a consensus could be
reached."
The final step, assuming the air pollution passed the pervasive regulation
test, is determining whether the inspection system adequately protected the
privacy interests of business entities. This note does not purport to give an indepth analysis of the inspection system contained in the Clean Air Act;
however, the relevant portions of the United States Code charging the EPA
with enforcement of air pollution laws do not provide a great deal of structure with regard to regular, periodic inspections, nor do they exhibit an overt
concern with the privacy interests of the industries they are designed to
regulate."
Conclusion
The fourth amendment has its roots in the experiences of businesses subjected to unreasonable, warrantless searches. Although the amendment does
not specifically cite businesses as protected entities, the history of the amendment and judicial interpretation have extended its protection to business entities. Culminating with See, the Supreme Court has gradually expanded the
scope of that protection. Since then, limited exceptions to the general rule
that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable have been made.
The Supreme Court's decision in Dow is not necessarily incorrect; under
the approach suggested here, the Court could have reached the same result.
The problem is that by using the reasonable expectation standard from Katz,
the Court was forced to look at Dow's facility in terms of either curtilage or
open field. It is submitted that an industrial complex can legitimately be compared to the curtilage of a home based on the privacy interests protected
within a structure and the similar activities that take place outside of the
structure. The Supreme Court rejected this idea by concluding that Dow's
facility was more analogous to an open field. Even if the Court had recognized the industrial curtilage, Dow's plant was still exposed to aerial observation, demonstrating that Dow could not have had a reasonable expectation of
privacy from those vantage points directly above it.
The Court's sanction of the reasonable expectation approach in this context impinges on fourth amendment protection in four ways. First, expectations can be manipulated by external sources. Government can affect
whether expectations are reasonable by its own actions, regardless of whether
those actions are reasonable themselves. Private actions, exempted from
fourth amendment scrutiny, can set the stage for the alteration of expecta-

114. See generally Martin, EPA and Administrative inspections, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 123,
131-32 (1979), which argues that the EPA does not engage in the type of pervasive regulation
discussed in Marshall and Donovan.

115. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a) (1982).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss2/5

